Why Did We Suspend Aid to Egypt Again
Last Oct, the Obama administration announced it was holding back four large-scale weapons systems purchased for Arab republic of egypt, including 125 M1-A1 battle tank kits, twenty F-16 fighter jets, xx Harpoon cruise missiles, and x Apache assault helicopters. Information technology made their delivery contingent upon "credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian authorities through free and fair elections." This was a significant move, the first fourth dimension a US administration had ever suspended any of the annual $1.3 billion military assist package. The administration lifted its concur on the Apaches, which are now on their way to Egypt, but the other weapons remain in storage in the U.s., more a twelvemonth later on.
The new aid policy, along with restrictions on war machine assistance enacted by Congress, sought to modify the bargain with Egypt from weapons in exchange for peace with State of israel, to weapons in exchange for peace and democratic progress. This has of grade angered Egypt, used to a steady menstruation of American weapons since the 1979 Peace Treaty regardless of its human rights record. On his beginning trip to the United States as president final month, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi complained nigh the interruption in a Charlie Rose interview. The Peace Treaty remains secure, just the policy has not advanced stated US democracy goals. During the past year, Egypt has slid dorsum into authoritarian rule, experiencing one of the worst periods of repression in its modern history. This article discusses why the suspension has not been an effective democracy promotion lever; a forthcoming article will comprehend the condition of the military aid on which Congress has imposed republic conditions.
Download the article as a PDF here
The Suspension Decision
The decision to append these weapons came reluctantly, several months after the Egyptian military'south July 3, 2013, ouster of President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. Fearing a rupture with the military that would jeopardize US security interests, the US assistants did not take any punitive action immediately after Morsi's overthrow. Instead information technology adopted a cautious, wait-and-see approach, hoping, forth with many Egyptians, that the coup would set the country chop-chop on a more autonomous path.
The security forces' bloody dispersal of pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo'southward Raba'a and Nahda squares concluding August 14 shattered the administration's wishful thinking and threatened to unleash a destabilizing bike of violence. The sheer calibration of the state violence past a US ally—Human Rights Lookout has documented that a minimum of 900 protestors were killed that day—cried out for a response. The following morn, President Barack Obama declared that "while we want to sustain our relationship with Egypt, our traditional cooperation cannot continue as usual when civilians are being killed in the streets and rights are beingness rolled dorsum."
It was not until nearly two months later on, still, that the administration announced what the no-business-as-usual policy would hateful in exercise. This was a partial help pause, designed to express strong displeasure to Cairo and to demonstrate, especially to US domestic critics, the assistants's commitment to human rights, just without upending bilateral ties or having to terminate United states of america defense contracts (the weapons had been paid for, only not delivered).
Challenges and Opportunities for US Influence
There are several reasons why the pause has not had results equally a democracy promotion tool. Heavy factors in Egypt have been stacked against such external influence. The mail service-coup government has felt itself in a battle of survival against the ousted Alliance. Information technology has enjoyed strong support from many Egyptians also equally from its Gulf donors to beat the group, clamp downwardly other dissent, and restore "stability." In such circumstances the preferences of an exterior power immediately are diminished. In addition, Egypt's new leadership needs to legitimize itself and one obvious way to do so is to pollex its olfactory organ at Egypt's old patron, the United states. Furthermore there is no song constituency inside Egypt to amplify U.s. messages on democracy. Association with the unpopular U.s.a. on such sensitive matters is dangerous and the US administration has done little to build trust amid those Egyptians who practice oppose a render to autocratic dominion.
Only information technology is likewise true that the United States is not without leverage that it could accept practical, peculiarly early. It could have maximized the opportunity of timing and taken much stronger action, closely coordinated with Europe, right after Morsi's ouster and Raba'a—when the eyes of the globe were on Arab republic of egypt and the new government'southward international legitimacy was the most vulnerable. The administration could have withheld other military assist, as a more serious incentive for a grade correction. The Egypt military tin alive without the suspended weapons for a while—information technology already has 220 F-16s, thirty-four Apaches (though not all are operable), and more than one,100 M1-A1 tanks. Suspending maintenance for Egypt'due south existing stock of US-origin weapons, more important for its day-to-solar day operations, would have been a much tougher signal. The United States quietly could have frozen some of Egypt's privileges, such as cash menstruum financing or the ability to employ the involvement accrued from its special Foreign Military machine Financing (FMF) account to procure additional United states of america arms across the $1.3 billion annual package. The assistants could have put a moratorium on high-level visits. Rather, Secretary of State John Kerry went to Cairo a few weeks later the assist suspension.
The administration was averse to playing hard ball for many reasons. Fundamentally it has been ambivalent almost how much a autonomous Egypt really matters to core Usa interests. Thus it has not felt an imperative to accept stronger measures that could provoke a backlash and lead Egypt to withdraw vital security cooperation. At the middle of the hesitancy seems to be a perception that in the dynamic of the post-Mubarak era, Cairo holds more than cards than Washington.
Private Force per unit area, Public Praise
Instead, the assistants has employed relatively soft tactics with the aid suspension. The centerpiece of the approach has been Secretary Kerry'south frequent private diplomacy, trying to encourage Egypt'southward leadership to pursue a more autonomous path. (Obama has mostly kept his distance.) The focus, quite accordingly, has been on the need to uphold freedom of association and assembly and protect human rights, more than on holding elections per Sisi's "road map." Kerry reportedly has pressed for revisions to the harsh protest constabulary and for improvements to the NGO law, as well every bit for the release of certain imprisoned activists and journalists. (Accountability for the bloodshed at Raba'a, the original trigger for the suspension, does not appear to have been a major part of the calendar.)
None of this has borne fruit so far. Mixed and inconsistent US messages from the outset take sapped US influence, weakened its standing, and drained the policy of value even just equally a firm moral and political stance confronting repression. US officials insist that Kerry delivers tough messages in private. On a few occasions, after particularly troubling events such every bit the handing down of death sentences against hundreds of Morsi supporters in March, he has issued sharply critical statements. Simply otherwise Kerry has shied away from public censure, leaving this part to State Department spokespeople. Instead he mainly has conveyed a positive message of Egypt's enduring importance, the government's commitment to democracy, and the United states of america commitment to the country, seemingly without much regard to its worsening homo rights state of affairs. "We will work hard to augment what is a longstanding and deep partnership between the United States and Arab republic of egypt," he said in June, noting he detected a "serious sense of purpose and delivery" past Egypt'south leadership to run into popular demands for "dignity, justice." On a visit last weekend, Kerry expressed "our strong support for Arab republic of egypt as it undertakes pregnant reforms." Kerry has suggested that the "transition" is succeeding but needs just a bit more progress before the United States tin can offering its full endorsement. He has minimized the significance of the aid suspension, calling information technology "not a punishment" and "a very small result."
Presumably the hope has been that avoiding direct public criticism will make Egyptian officials more responsive, just this has not worked. Egypt has pocketed Kerry's praise, rebuffed his private entreaties (such equally when a courtroom sentenced Al Jazeera journalists to prison the day after his visit in June, over his exhortations), argued strenuously that Egypt is on the path to commonwealth, and continued the crackdown. Recently, as the United States has moved to strengthen ties with Sisi and expand counter-terrorism cooperation, fatigue over pressing Egypt on man rights seems to be setting in and the suspension has hardly been mentioned.
The Story of the Apaches
Because the break was an executive branch decision, not a congressional requirement, the administration tin can adjust its policy and change course at any time. This is exactly what happened with the Apaches. Initially the administration held business firm as Arab republic of egypt argued that information technology needed more Apaches for its campaign against a jihadist insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula. A senior Department of Defense official testified to Congress concluding October that the hold on the Apaches was "not affecting [Egypt's] operational effectiveness in the Sinai at all." In the subsequent months, Kerry tried to convince Arab republic of egyptto make pocket-size human rights gestures to justify releasing the helicopters, without success. By last spring, the administration changed its mind, in the face of growing worries over the extremist threat in the Sinai (likewise as lobbying from Egypt, its Gulf supporters, and Israel). On April 22, before a high-level Egyptian visit to Washington, the assistants announced that it was sending the Apaches for use in Sinai counter-terrorism. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chairman of the Senate subcommittee that oversees foreign help, quickly blocked the move. Leahy, a congressional man rights champion and a strong advocate of linking war machine aid to Arab republic of egypt's democratic progress, was highly disturbed by the mass death sentences. Some other concern was that the Usa didn't have plenty visibility about whether the Apaches were beingness used in attacks on noncombatants in the Sinai. Leahy set tough conditions, including releasing certain political prisoners and allowing access for journalists and NGOs to the Sinai.
Over the months, Kerry tried to convince his former Senate colleague to set aside his concerns. On August 29, the State Department announced that the Apaches would exist on their manner for the Sinai campaign. Several factors may have contributed to Leahy's change of center. A major one is the new US preoccupation with the rise of the Islamic State of Syria and al-Sham (ISIS), which gives more urgency to Egypt's Sinai campaign. Another is congressional dynamics: although some members of the Appropriations Committee share Leahy'southward human rights concerns, none were willing to bring together him in this example. Finally, perhaps Leahy concluded that belongings the Apaches was not having any effect. He and other lawmakers may be gearing for a harder stance on a carve up saucepan of assist, $728 million in new FMF, some of which will require Kerry to make democracy certifications to Congress.
What Happens Next?
The tanks, F-16s, and missiles suspended concluding October are still on agree. If the administration doesn't want to take action any time soon, the weapons could sit in storage for a while longer. Ultimately, the United States could decide to redirect them to other uses, although such a footstep would exist rare. In that location is a constituency inside the assistants and Congress, withal, that wants to stage out the traditional big-ticket weapons and focus the FMF program more than on counter-terrorism and chapters-building. The suspension has chipped away at a longstanding statement against such a change—that the uninterrupted flow of these weapons is required to protect US security interests. Over the past year, Egypt has connected to provide expedited approval for overflights of its territory, head-of-the-line privileges for US Navy warships to traverse the Suez Culvert (the special surcharge paid past the Usa surely helps), and counter-terrorism cooperation. Egypt's relations with Israel are the best in recent memory. Thus, this experience could nudge open the door to a long-overdue, politically arduous restructuring of the aid package.
Given the pattern of Us-Egypt relations since 2011, in which the United states has at times taken a stand on republic and man rights only to back downwardly in the face of intense Egyptian pushback, the administration probably will relent and release the other three weapons systems, in order to start a fresh chapter with Sisi. If Egypt continues on an disciplinarian trajectory, the administration would have to credit Sisi with false democratic progress to justify such a decision. Or, it could affirm that the other weapons (tanks?) are now essential for counter-terrorism. Either move would meet some resistance in Congress and further erode Usa democracy credibility, but the assistants may view these as tolerable costs.
Conclusion
The administration is unlikely to adopt a tougher commonwealth stance anytime soon, particularly after the frustrating feel with the aid suspension. To many in Washington, Sisi's strongman country is preferable to the vehement fracturing of Republic of iraq, Libya, Syrian arab republic, and Republic of yemen. The hard questions that few seem to be asking, withal, are whether repression can ever create lasting stability in Arab republic of egypt and whether Sisi's oppressive rule will worsen the very trouble of regional terrorism the United States seeks to combat.
Amy Hawthorne is a senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Centre for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council.
Source: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-s-happening-with-suspended-military-aid-for-egypt-part-i/
0 Response to "Why Did We Suspend Aid to Egypt Again"
Post a Comment